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Abstract 
 
 
In 1991, Bryant and Eckard estimated the annual probability that a cartel would be 
detected by the US Federal authorities, conditional on being detected, to be at most 
between 13 % and 17 %. 15 years later, we estimated the same probability over a 
European sample and we found an annual probability that falls between 12.9 % and 
13.3 %. We also develop a detection model to clarify this probability. Our estimate is 
based on detection durations, calculated from data reported for all the cartels convicted 
by the European Commission from 1969 to the present date, and a statistical birth and 
death process model describing the onset and detection of cartels.  
 
En 1991, Bryant et Eckard estiment que la probabilité annuelle de détection des cartels 
qui seront finalement détectés par les autorités de concurrence américaines, se situe 
entre 13 et 17 %. 15 ans après, nous estimons cette probabilité sur un échantillon 
européen, et nous trouvons que cette probabilité se situe entre 12,9 et 13,3 %. De plus, 
nous développons un modèle de détection des cartels nous permettant d’expliciter cette 
probabilité. Notre estimation est basée sur les durées de détection de tous les cartels 
condamnés par la Commission européenne depuis 1969, et sur un modèle statistique de 
processus de vie et de mort décrivant la naissance et la détection des cartels.  
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1. Introduction 
The probability of detection plays a key role in the economics of crime, particularly in 
the literature related to optimal sanctions to be imposed on lawbreakers. Thus, in 
competition economics, particularly in studies on cartel dissuasion, this parameter is 
used to compute the optimal fine to be imposed on cartel members, so as to deter their 
formation. In a Beckerian perspective1, crime dissuasion implies that the illegal profit 
made by the cartel or damage caused to society2, is equal or inferior to the expected fine 
– which corresponds to average fine times the probability of getting caught. This value 
is very important to managers willing to join or create a cartel. The probability of 
detection is a determinant parameter of their utility function as cartel formation relates 
to decision making under uncertainty. Therefore, the estimation of cartels probability of 
detection is a crucial issue for antitrust authorities, in the view of designing an optimal 
policy regarding the fight against cartels.  
Unfortunately, very few studies are available on that subject. Bryant and Eckard (1991) 
were the first - and to the present date the sole - to estimate rigorously the probability of 
cartel detection. Their estimation was based on an American sample of cartels indicted 
by the DOJ3 between 1961 and 1988. Their paper became the most quoted work on this 
issue. Nevertheless, the results were often improperly quoted. In particular, in the 
literature related to optimal fines, the authors often refer to a value of 15 %, as the 
                                                 
1  Cf. Becker (1968). 
2  Cf. Combe & Monnier (2007a). In the crime theory, the usual base is the damage caused to society, as 
it ensures that only efficient crimes occur – crimes for which the benefit from breaking the law 
exceeds the cost endured by the victims. In the specific case of a cartel, the illicit gain is always 
inferior to the damage inflicted to consumers - except in the case where price elasticity is zero, which 
implies that the two values are equal. Therefore, it seems more accurate to use the illegal profit as the 
agent decision to break the law depends on the expected net illegal gain, and not on the inflicted 
damage. For instance, this choice is the one made by Werden & Simon (1987). 
3  Department of Justice. 
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average probability of getting caught, as Bryant and Eckard estimated a probability that 
falls between 13 % and 17 %. But this 15 % rate is the annual probability of getting 
caught… for cartels which will eventually be detected. This feature can be explained by 
the fact that the sample on which was based their estimation comprised only convicted 
cartels, as - by definition - no data exists on cartels that went undetected. Thus, the 
estimated probability is not the global probability of detection. It is the probability of 
detection conditional on being detected on a given period. It is an upper bound of the 
global probability of detection in a given period and it is positively related to it.  
In this article, we will first present a model of cartel detection, so as to clarify the 
different processes and probabilities at stake- later on, it will allow us to interpret 
rigorously our estimates and to draw our conclusions. Second, we will explain the 
methodology used, regarding data collection and statistical processing. Last, we will 
expose and analyze our estimation and results.  
2. Cartel detection model 
2.1.  Hypothesis 
 
Bryant and Eckard (1991) introduced a birth and death process to describe the dynamic 
that governs N(t), the number of cartels alive at time t. We also model cartel detection 
using this framework. However, contrary to these authors, in the following model, we 
consider three processes: one related to cartel birth, another to their natural death, and 
the last one governs their detection. Some cartels are detected while still active, and we 
suppose that detection triggers the breakup of the cartel- due to antitrust intervention. In 
other cases, cartels are detected ex post - i.e. after their death. Cartel lifetime is therefore 
deemed “natural”.4  
We must specify the three processes chosen - birth process, death process, detection 
process. First, we consider that cartels appear ones after the others according to a 
random variable. We denote Ai the time between the birth of the (i-1)th cartel and the 
birth of the ith cartel - inter-arrival times between the birth of successive cartels - and we 
hypothesize that the (Ai)i>0 are independently and exponentially distributed with mean 
(1/θ). Second, we suppose that each cartel i has a natural lifetime Di=D, independently 
and exponentially distributed with mean 1/Λ . Last, we hypothesize that at a given time 
                                                 
4  As for them, Bryant & Eckard equate cartel death to detection - and therefore consider that cartel 
lifetime systematically equals the time required to detect the cartel. 
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t, when the ith cartel appears, if n describes the number of cartels that will be detected, 
but not yet detected at time t, our new-born cartel has a nq   probability to be subjected 
to the detection process (event E) and therefore to be detected in fine, and a (1- nq ) 
probability not to be subjected to this process and hence to remain unknown (event E ).5 
In this latter case, the cartel will never be detected and will end due to natural causes. 
We suppose that the sequence ( nq )n∈N is decreasing
6 and by the way of example that: 
1,
1n
n q
n
∀ ∈ = +`  
 
If for the ith cartel born, the event E occurs, we suppose that the cartel is immediately 
subjected to the detection process. Therefore, at time t, we have N(t) cartels under 
investigation and there are all subjected to the detection process. We define this process 
in the following way: if we consider a cartel i that will get detected and if we denote Li 
the duration between its birth and its detection, we suppose that for any i, Li is 
exponentially distributed with mean (1/λ). Thus, cartels for which event E occurs, have 
a mean detection duration of (1/λ) and an instantaneous detection probability of λ. 
Finally, given the limited capacity of antitrust authorities - because of budget and legal 
constraints - we suppose that only Nmax cartels at most can be investigated at the same 
time, i.e. N(t) is bounded by Nmax.  
 
2.2.  Main results in steady state 
 
We observe the system in steady state, a long time after the three processes have begun, 
so that initial conditions (starting date of the process for instance) have no incidence on 
the final result. We can classify cartels into three subpopulations: 
- undetected cartels: population 1Ω   
- cartels detected ex post (after their natural death): denoted population 2Ω  
- cartels detected alive: denoted population 3Ω  
                                                 
5  Our framework is similar to a queuing model with discouragement: the service time corresponds to 
the duration required to detect the cartel and discouragement relates to cartels that will not be detected 
by antitrust authorities, as some cartels will never be detected - given the budget constraint and the 
limited investigation power of antitrust authorities. 
6  Indeed, when a new cartel appears, the greater the number of cartels already under investigation, the 
lower the probability that this new cartel will be subjected to the detection process - antitrust 
authorities being busy. 
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Figure 1: Cartel birth, death and detection process 
 
2.3.  Process specification 
 
The process already described is markovian, inter-arrival times depending on the state 
of the system: at time t, if there are already N(t)=n cartels likely to be detected, the 
arrival of a new cartel occurs with a .nq θ intensity. For each new cartel subjected to the 
detection process, the detection duration follow an exponential law with parameterλ . 
Therefore, if n cartels are likely to be detected, the time to move to the state (n-1) is the 
minimum of n variables i.i.d. exponentially distributed with parameter λ , i.e. an 
exponentially distributed law with parameter .n λ . Hence, the transition rate from the 
state n to the state (n-1) is .n λ . This birth and death process7 admits the following state 
transition diagram:  
 
Figure 2: State transition diagram 
 
 
 
This process is an infinite server queue (M/M/∞ type), with varying entering rates.  
 
                                                 
7  In this case, death is similar to detection. Death from natural causes is not taken into account, as we 
only focus on detection.  
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- At  steady state, the law governing the number of cartels N subjected to the 
detection process at any time is defined as: 
Let denote nπ =Prob (N=n) and r θλ= . We can show that: 
0 1
0 02
... 1 .
1 ... ( !)
n
nn
n
q q r
n n
θπ π πλ
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- The global probability of detection is therefore:  
 
Let denote Π  the global probability of detection: 
max
0
N
n=
Π = ∑ Prob (being detected| N=n). Prob(N=n)= max
0
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Figure 3: evolution of Π  according to r θλ=  for max 5N = and max 100N =  
 
 
 
The limits found confirm our intuition: 
 
- When r tends to 0, i.e. the birth rate is very low compared to the detection rate; 
the antitrust authorities can detect all new cartels.  
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- When r tends to infinite, the antitrust authorities are overwhelmed, more and 
more cartels are not subjected to the detection process and the global probability 
of detection tends to 0. Nevertheless, we note on figure 3 that the convergence 
towards zero is very slow. Therefore, Π  increases with λ. 
 
- The instantaneous probability of detection of a cartel that will be detected in 
fine:  
 
The instantaneous probability of detection of a cartel for which event E occurs isλ . 
Hence, λ  is the instantaneous probability of detection of a cartel that will be detected in 
fine. 
 
- The global instantaneous probability of detection π : 
 
A cartel that does not know whether it will be detected or not (i.e. if it is the event E or 
the event E that occurred) perceived the following instantaneous probability of 
detection: 
[ ]
0
[ . ] . . .N N N N n n
n
E q E q qπ λ λ λ π+∞
=
= = = ∑  
This implies: 
.π λ= Π  
We note that λ  is an upper bound of π . 
To sump up, it appears that one must distinguish between three different values: 
- The instantaneous probability of detection for a cartel that will be detected: λ  
- the global instantaneous probability of detection: π  
- the global probability of detection: Π  
Bryant and Eckard (1991) estimated the instantaneous probability of detection for 
cartels that will be detected, which corresponds to λ . Considering that some cartels are 
never detected and remain unknown, the global probability of detection is necessarily 
inferior toλ 8. We formalized this intuition, proving that λ  is an upper bound of the 
                                                 
8  Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2005) where the first to note that λ  is the probability of detection in a given 
year if all cartels were detected with probability one. If 10 % were detected in fine, the global 
probability of being detected in a given year would amount to one tenth ofλ . If 1 % of cartels were 
detected, it would equates to one hundredth ofλ . 
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global instantaneous probability of detection. Furthermore, the global probability of 
detection varies positively with λ .  
 
2.4.  Birth and death process for the estimation 
 
Among all cartels born, we limit ourselves to the study of the sub-population of cartels 
eventually detected, these cartels being subjected to a simple life and death process 
(considering death as detection). The detection process is still characterized by the 
parameterλ . But the parameter that specifies the birth process is θ ’= (θ |the cartel will 
be detected). It is linked to the θ  parameter by the following relationship: 
1' [ . ] . .
1N N N
E q E
N
θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤= = = Π⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦  
We can note that θ ’<θ : there are more cartels born than cartels finally detected - as 
some cartels remain unknown. As we do not have data on undetected cartels, we can 
only estimate the detection and birth process which applies to the subpopulation of 
detected cartels - of parameter λ  and θ ’. 
- First,λ  is an upper bound of the global instantaneous probability of detection. 
And the global probability of detection varies positively with it. Hence, the 
higherλ , the greater the probability a cartel will be detected.  
- Second, it is likely that, in their decision making, firms take into account the 
parameterλ , as the global probability of detection is unknown.9 
In this article, we will estimate the instantaneous probability of detection for a cartel 
that will be detected in fine, i.e. the value of the λ  parameter. Our estimates are based 
on a sample of all the cartels detected and convicted by the European Commission from 
1969 to 2007.10 After the presentation of the methodology - regarding data processing 
and statistical estimation - we present the results of our study.  
                                                 
9  Particularly, if the value of λ is common knowledge, thanks to the work of economists, firms do not 
have a better knowledge of Π , the global probability than we do. Thus, managers may not take their 
decision on the basis of this global probability of detection Π . 
10  From a database we created.  
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3. Methology 
This work is based on the detection duration - duration between birth and detection - of 
cartels convicted by the European Commission, as no data exist on undetected cartels or 
non convicted ones. 11  Our sample encompasses 86 cases of cartels that have affected 
European trade - at least two members states and/or the trade between members affected12, and 
convicted by the European Commission between 1969 and 2007.13 
 
3.1.  Computation of cartels detection duration 
 
Lifetimes and detection duration 
 
Cartels can break up because of detection or because they die “naturally”. We aim to 
estimate the probability of detection of a cartel, which corresponds to the period from 
the birth of the cartel to its detection. If the cartel is detected while it is still active14, 
before its natural death, then cartel lifetime equates its detection duration. But, when the 
cartel terminates from natural causes15 and is detected afterwards, detection duration is 
no more similar to lifetime, and we must reprocess these data. First, we will present the 
methodology related to lifetime computation, when it corresponds to detection duration. 
Then, we will study the case of naturally dead cartels, detected ex post. Concerning 
cartels detected alive - and therefore dead because of detection16- we have computed 
cartels lifetimes in days, using the estimation made by the European Commission to 
compute fines and reported in its decisions. In a number of cases, it is presumed that the 
cartel lasted longer than the duration used by the Commission-because of lack of proof. 
Therefore, durations used in our estimation may be underestimated and should be 
considered as lower bounds. In particular, the begin date of the cartel corresponds to the 
date for which the first evidence of collusion were found, and not necessarily to the 
actual starting date of the conspiracy. It is likely that the cartel date of birth is anterior to 
                                                 
11  Most of detected cartels are finally convicted, thanks to the introduction of leniency notice and the 
reinforcement of the investigation powers of antitrust authorities. 
12 Criteria of affected trade as defined by the Commission in its Guidelines on the effect on trade 
concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 81-96. 
13  The first cartel convicted of our sample is the Quinine cartel in 1969 and the last one is the elevator 
one in February 2007.  
14  Regarding cartel detection, we can distinguish between sector inquiry or a targeted one. These 
targeted inquiries can originated from a complaint from competitors or clients, or from a denunciation, 
which plays a key role since the introduction of leniency notice in the European Union in 1996, see 
Combe & Monnier (2007b). 
15  Regarding cartels terminating from « natural » causes, we can distinguish cheating or withdrawal, the 
arrival of one or several new players in the market, others supply or demand changes-demand increase, 
advances in technology etc. - which influence the benefits of collusion, can provoke a break up. 
16  These cartels represent 80 cases on the 86 cartels of our sample, which means the great majority. 
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the date claim by firms or put forward by the Commission. The fine imposed on an 
undertaking being positively correlated to its involvement duration in the cartel, it is in 
the firm interest not to disclose the actual begin date of the collusive agreement.17  
Sometimes, it can happen that collusion goes on after the detection of the cartel by 
antitrust authorities.18 Nevertheless, we will not take into account this rare phenomenon, 
difficult to assess. In our study, we suppose that detection always triggers the death of 
the cartel. In all other cases, to calculate duration, we consider the ending date for which 
it has been proven that firms have stopped colluding.   
Furthermore, the duration of each undertaking own involvement in the cartel is not 
necessarily the same. Therefore, we use the global duration of the cartel, as indicated on 
the Commission’s decision. 
Last, we must explain how we dealt with successive or intertwined cartels or 
agreements. In a lot cases, firms have agreed to collude on several markets, i.e. on 
several products or geographic areas. 19  Moreover, it happens that some ended 
agreements are followed by new ones - successive agreements. 20  We can also 
distinguish between formal agreements and/or concerted practices - implying most of 
the time exchange of information - related to price fixing or market sharing. These 
practices are regrouped under the aegis of a sole cartel. Usually, the decision of the 
Commission reports only the global duration of the cartel and there is no distinction in it 
between different agreements, as the ruling of the Court of First Instance, refers to the 
concept of complex infringement.21 Nevertheless, in the three following cases: Vitamins 
                                                 
17  For more details, Levenstein & Suslow (2002) discuss the difficulty to date the beginning and the end 
of a cartel and make a review of the literature on this topic.  
18  For instance, in its decision 94/599/CE regarding the PVC cartel in 1994- § 49 of the decision- the 
Commission explains that: “in the absence of information from the producers, it is not even possible 
to establish whether or not the collusion - in some form or other - has ever ended. Clearly the cartel 
continued after the Commission carried out its first investigations into the PVC sector in late 1983. 
The document found at Atochem shows that monitoring of sales quotas was being operated and 
information exchanged as late as May 1984. The phenomenon of initiatives involving several 
producers simultaneously attempting to raise price levels to a particular level was still being reported 
in the trade press at the time of the investigation in 1987”. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) also evoke 
the case of the Organic Peroxides, convicted in 2003.  
19  For instance, the Vitamins cartel lasted for 10 years and relates to agreements on nine vitamins and 
four chemicals, and the 22 producers involved did not participate to all the agreements.  
20  See for instance the Citric Acid cartel case. 
21  Accordingly the ruling of the Court of First Instance “in the context of a complex infringement which 
involves many producers seeking over a number of years to regulate the market between them, the 
Commission cannot be expected to classify the infringement precisely, for each undertaking and for 
any given moment, as in any event both those forms of infringement are covered by Article [81] of the 
Treaty”, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 20 April 1999 in Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-
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Cartel, Special Graphite Cartel, and Peroxygen Cartel, the Commission distinguishes 
between several agreements, denoted as sub-agreements - on different markets - of the 
same cartel, dividing up their durations. For these three cartels, we calculated the mean 
duration of the cartel – identifying and excluding naturally dead sub-agreements. For all 
other intertwined cartels, we take the global duration of the cartel, as reported in the 
decision of the Commission.  
Most decisions contain precise begin and end dates - day, month, year. But in some 
cases, only the year is given or the most precise identification is to the month22 . 
Therefore, we used two methods to calculate cartel duration. The first method defines a 
minimum duration (DUR1) to be the period from the latest begin day to the earliest end 
day of the cartel - for instance if the decision indicates that the cartel began in 1971 and 
continued to at least October 1975, the latest begin day is December 31, 1971 and the 
earliest end day is October 1, 1975. The second method defines the maximal duration 
(DUR 2) to be the period from the earliest begin day to the latest end day. In the above 
example, the earliest begin day is January 1, 1971 and the latest end day is October 31, 
1975. These two measures give us a range of values and each is defined to include all 
cases in the sample. This method also corresponds to the methodology used by Bryant 
and Eckard.  
These strict hypotheses - in particular the use of lifetimes reported to compute fines - 
warrant that our results are reliable, as they are not based on assumptions or even strong 
presumptions. These durations correspond to lower bound, implying a possible 
overestimation of the probability of detection. The results of cartels lifetimes 
computations are sump up in the following table.  
 
Table 1: Cartel duration 
 
 Median Mean Standard Error 
DUR Min 5,5 7,46 5,82 
DUR Max 5,98 7,8 5,9 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse 
Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission. 
22  Particularly in the case of not yet published decisions. 
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Table 2: Comparison to other studies on cartel duration 
  
 Mean 
Duration 
Median Standard 
Error 
Nb of cases 
Bryant & Eckard (1991) 6.2 4.7 na 184 
Zimmerman & Connor (2005) 6.3 4.4 na 166 
Levenstein & Suslow (2006) 7.5 na 5.4 72 
na: non available     
 
The average lifetime of a European cartel is about 7.5 to 7.7 years - the median is 6 
years, so as the standard error - which corresponds to the cartel duration computed in 
other works23, particularly in Levenstein & Suslow (2006).24 
 
3.2.  Naturally dead cartels  
In some cases, the date at which the cartel breaks up does not correspond to its detection, 
and it happens that firms can prove that the cartel was no more active since many years. 
In our sample, contrary to what economic theory suggests25 convicted cartels are most 
of the time still active when the Commission starts its investigations, and terminate 
collusion after this intervention. Only 6 cartels26 and 10 sub-agreements of our 86 
convicted cartels are naturally dead.27 Contrary to Bryant and Eckard we computed 
detection durations of these naturally dead cartels. Their lifetimes are shorter than their 
detection durations, by definition. Hence, we add to the computed lifetimes, the 
duration between the natural death of the cartel and its detection. Therefore, the data 
related to those cartels are similar to the one related to cartels detected alive. The 
estimated probability is therefore a probability of detection. This specific processing 
also allows us to focus on two processes - birth and detection - and to avoid the complex 
distinction between cartels naturally dead and detected ex post and cartels dead because 
of detection. 
                                                 
23  The minimum duration is less than three months for the French Beef Cartel and the longest one which 
last 29 years is the Organic Peroxide Cartel. Most of our cartels are dead because of prosecution. 
Therefore detection durations are almost similar to cartels durations in our study.  
24  Their work is based on cartels convicted by the DOJ and the European Commission. 
25  According to Stigler (1964), once firms have decided to form a cartel, each undertaking has an interest 
to cheat and to lower its price. See also Armentano discussion on cartel instability (1996). But 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1996) showed that Stigler had neglected the impact of a withdrawal or 
of an entry of an undertaking on prices and profits.  
26  The Quinine Cartel condemned in 1969, the Zinc Producers Group Cartel condemned in 1984, the 
FENEX Cartel condemned in 1996, the Ferry Operators Cartel condemned in 1996, the Citric Acid 
Cartel 2001, the Peroxygen Products Cartel condemned in 1984 and the Hydrogen Peroxide and 
Perborate (PBS) Cartel condemned in 2006. 
27   Nine sub-agreements of the vitamin cartel are dead before their detection because of the increase in 
Chinese imports, and one sub-agreements of the Specialty Graphite Cartel. 
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3.3.  Is detection duration a random variable? 
Bryant and Eckard regressed cartels lifetimes on two different explanatory variables: the 
number of undertakings involved and their market shares. Comme aucune de ces 
variables n’est explicative, les auteurs en concluent que la durée de vie d’un cartel peut 
être traitée comme une variable aléatoire. Neither variable is correlated with their cartel 
duration measures. Thus, the authors conclude that cartel duration can be viewed as a 
random variable. 
According to them, cartel duration should be longer the fewer the number of firms 
involved and the larger their market share, ceteris paribus. While these hypotheses are 
clear for cartel natural duration - i.e. for cartel terminating for “natural” causes, e.g., 
cheating, or irreconcilable differences among conspirators. It is less clear that they apply 
to cartel dead by detection.  
As for us, we regress cartel detection duration on four explaining variables28 - number 
of undertakings, professional organization involvement, cartel dimension (global, 
European or national) and industry specific conditions - which economic theory29 and 
empirical studies 30  suggest should be related to cartel duration. Particularly, these 
factors can apply to detection duration and therefore to a sample of cartels terminated as 
a result of investigation31. Indeed, the greater the number of firms involved, the more 
likely is detection: numerous pieces of evidence, higher risk of denunciation. The 
industry in which the cartel operates could also influence the detection process. 
Moreover, cartel dimension can contribute to make detection more likely.32 As cartel 
dimension widen, detection duration should decrease. Indeed, international - or global - 
cartels can be detected both in Europe and in the United States. European cartels can be 
caught by any national competition authority inside the European Union. Last, the 
intervention of a professional organization should influence the probability for a cartel 
to be detected, but it is difficult to predict how - a better organization implies a lower 
risk of detection but also a greater visibility towards competition authorities. Indeed, 
some markets are more transparent than others, and the detection of anticompetitive 
                                                 
28  It corresponds to cartel duration in most of cases. 
29   Motta (2004) analyses the main factors of stability of cartels.  
30   See Zimmerman & Connor (2005), Levenstein & Suslow (2006), Combe & Monnier (2007) for an 
empirical study the determinants of cartel duration. 
31   As a matter of fact, the determinants of cartel detection are not necessarily the same as the 
determinants of cartels natural breakup. 
32   In some cases, it can be difficult for national antitrust authorities to convict international cartels 
because of the problems related to the extraterritorial application of antitrust law. See Jenny (2003).  
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collusion should be easier in these industries - that can be subject to a specific 
monitoring from antitrust authorities. Neither variable is correlated to our cartel duration 
measures at a 5 % threshold.33 As Bryant and Eckard, we therefore consider detection 
duration as a random variable. And this assertion justifies the fact that we apply a single 
birth a death process on the overall sample. 
4.  Estimation and empirical results 
 
4.1. Estimation of the instantaneous probability of detection 
 
We use a birth and death process, a continuous Markov chain, to describe N(t), the 
number of cartels alive at a time t. Suppose at time t=0 there exist no cartel. A any time 
t>0, we suppose that in a short interval of time from t to t+h, only three changes in N(t) 
are possible for h sufficiently small: 
 -Let N(t) changes from N(t) to N(t)-1 with probability  λ.h+o(h) 
 -Let N(t) changes from N(t) to N(t)+1 with probability θ.h+o(h) 
 -Let N(t) remains unchanged with probability 1-(λ+θ).h+o(h) 
 
Li denotes the random variable relating to the detection duration of the ith cartel and Ai, 
the duration between the birth of the (i-1)th cartel and the birth of the ith cartel - which 
corresponds to inter-arrival times between the births of successive cartels.  
In such a process, the (Li)i=1..  and the (Ai)i=1.. are independently and exponentially 
distributed with means 1/λ  and 1/θ respectively: 
∀i=1.. n, Li∼Exp(λ) 
∀i=1.. n, Ai∼Exp(θ) 
To justify the use of exponential laws, and to see how close our assumption of 
exponentially fits the inter-arrival times and duration data, we make the following 
verification: if the random variable Li is exponentially distributed with means 1/λ, its 
distribution function is F(x)=1-exp(-λ x) and therefore, log[1-F(x)]=- λ x. We do not 
know F(x), but we can estimate the empirical cumulative distribution function ˆ ( )F x  = 
(number of observations ≤ x )/(total number of observations). In order to verify that the 
« Li∼Exp( λ ) » we analysis the figure of the function x→log[1- ˆ ( )F x ]. For an 
                                                 
33   See Appendix A. 
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exponential distribution, it should be approximately linear in x , which is verified on the 
figures below. We apply the same reasoning for the Ai. The R2 are very high: 0.9822 for 
detection duration and 0.9539 for inter-arrival times between successive births .These 
results justify our choice of exponential process.  
Figure 4: Exponential fit of detection durations inter-arrival times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we suppose that the process begins at time T0, which is unknown, but that 
we observe the process for cartels dead between [T1, T2] with T2>T1>T0. It implies that 
we have censored data - as cartels alive both at time T2 and T1 won’t be observed - and 
it makes the estimation more complex. 
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We use the maximum likelihood estimation method for right censored data. Therefore, 
the parameters λ and θ are estimated by the maximum likelihood method, as derived as 
followed34: 
1 2 1
1
( ,..., ) exp[ ( )]exp[ ]exp( )
n
n n
n i
i
V L L T T L wθ λ θ λ
=
= − − − ∑  
With 1 2 1( / ) exp[ ]{1 exp[ ( )]}w T T Tθ λ λ λ= − − − − . 
And λ is an estimate of the instantaneous probability of detection of cartels that will 
finally be detected.  
 
4.2. The beginning of the process 
As we can notice, the estimation of λ is function of the value of the T1 and T2 
parameters, themselves depending on the value of T0. Therefore, the method requires us 
to specify not only the sample period but also how long the process had continued 
before we began our observation. Instead of making a unique choice for T0, we 
estimated the value of λ for different values of T0. It appears that for value of T0 inferior 
to 1930, the estimation of λ is no longer sensible to the choice of T035. Indeed, as one 
can observe on the figure below, any choice of T0<1930 allow us to consider that the 
birth and death process has reached a steady state. Therefore we suppose that T1 is large 
enough, the process has reached a steady state. 
 
Figure 5: Lambda sensitivity to the choice of T0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34  See APPENDIX Bryant & Eckard (1991). 
35  Bryant & Eckard (1991) estimate their parameters for T0 values ranging from 1861 to 1936, and show 
that the estimation of the process reaches a steady state if we consider T1 as large enough.  
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Under the hypothesis related to the simple birth and death process model36, and given 
the censored data, the number of cartels alive at time t, N(t) with T1<t< T2 has a Poisson 
distribution with mean 2( / ){1 exp[ ]}{1 exp[ ( )]}t T tθ λ λ λ− − − − − , which can be simplified 
in 2( / ){1 exp[ ( )]}T tθ λ λ− − −  under the additional assumption that T1 is large enough. In 
this case, as t gets closer to T2, N(t) should decrease, which is empirically verified, as 
we can see on the figure bellow: 
 
Figure 6: Number of cartels alive at Time t 
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4.3.  Results  
Table 3: Parameters estimates 
 
  λ* 1/λ** 0*** 1/0**** 
DUR1 Days 0.000363 2753 0.02 50 
 Years 0.132 7.533 7.3 0.137 
DUR2 Days 0.000347 2880 0.02 50 
 Years 0.129 7.702 7.3 0.137 
 
*       Probability of cartel detection on a given day or year 
**     Mean detection duration 
***   Probability of cartel birth on a given day or year 
**** Mean inter-arrival times 
The results of the estimation of our parameters are sum up in table 3. As we can see, the 
detection duration is on average 7 years - 1/λ corresponds to the mean detection 
duration - and a new cartel eventually detected is born every 6 months, as 1/θ represents 
                                                 
36  The Li and Ai are independently and exponentially distributed: ∀i=1..n, Li∼Exp(λ) et Ai∼Exp(θ). 
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mean inter-arrival times in days or years. The probability of detection in a given year 
conditional on being detected is between 12.9 % and 13.2 %, which represents an upper 
bound of the global probability of detection. Therefore, the probability of detection in a 
given year is at most between 12.9 and 13.2 %. Bryant and Eckard showed that the 
average cartel lasted about five to seven year, and that a new cartel that will be finally 
detected was born about every 54 days - seven per year on average. Their probability of 
getting caught in a given year for a cartel, given that it will finally be detected, was 
between 13 % and 17 %.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Bryant & Eckard (1991) were the first to estimate probability of cartel detection. Their 
estimation was based on an American sample of cartels indicted by the DOJ between 
1961 and 1988. They obtained an annual probability of detection conditional on being 
detected between 13 % and 17 %. Using the same framework, we calculated the 
detection duration and the probability of detection - if all cartels were eventually 
convicted - over the sample of all the cartels convicted by the European Union from 
1969 to 2007. Our detection duration is about 7 years and a new cartel, which will 
eventually detected, is born every 6 months The probability of getting caught in a given 
year, conditional on being detected, is between 12.9 % and 13.2 %, which represents an 
upper boundary to the global probability of detection. Therefore, the probability of 
detection in a given year is at most between 12.9 % and 13.2 %.  
On the basis of these two studies, it is interesting to compare the probability of detection 
between geographic areas -and therefore to evaluate the respective efficiency of various 
antitrust policies. At first glance, the probability of detection being higher in the United 
States, one could conclude that the American antitrust authorities are more efficient in 
detecting cartels than the European Commission.  
Nevertheless, differences in the methodology, particularly relating to data collections, 
may also explain this discrepancy, regardless efficiency criteria:  
-  Bryant and Eckard used data less precise than ours. As a matter of fact, starting and 
ending dates of their sample are vague, which gives them a large range of 
probabilities, and undermines the significance of the spread between our results and 
theirs.  
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- Regarding naturally dead cartels, our data processing enables us to estimate detection 
durations, which is not the methodology followed by Bryant and Eckard. As they do 
not differentiate between naturally dead cartels and cartels terminating because of 
detection 37 , their estimation is biased. They estimate a death probability, not 
necessarily equivalent to the probability of detection, if some cartels died naturally 
and were detected ex post. By definition, these cartels have shorter lifetimes than 
detection duration.38  Therefore, their probability could be overestimated as their 
sample might include such cases.   
-  The study of Bryant and Eckard is based on American cartels-cartels indicted by the 
DOJ- most of which being probably national cartels. Regarding our sample, more 
than half of the cases are European cartels -at least two affected members- a quarter 
of the cases are global -defined as affecting Europe as well as at least one other 
major region of the world-, and less than 25 % of cartels are national –affecting a 
single member state and European trade. Hence, more than two third of the sample 
relates to international cartels. As Connor (2003) pointed out, durations of 
international cartels are typically longer than national ones.39  
 
We could also assess antitrust efficiency in detecting cartels across time. Particularly, 
the introduction of leniency programs in the European Union in 1996, should have 
contributed to reinforce the probability of detection. We do not have enough hindsight, 
and not enough data, to estimate the probability of detection over a recent period. It is 
too soon for us to assess these long terms effects, but it is an important topic for future 
research, as it would enable us to assess rigorously the effect of leniency programs on 
cartels detection, and therefore to evaluate precisely their efficiency- which has never 
been down40. We can already note that after 1996, in eight years, 40 cartels were 
detected, which corresponds to 5 detection per year on average, whereas before 1996 -in 
28 years- we count 46 detected cartels, implying 1.64 detection per year in average. 
This sharp increase of detected cartels could be explained by the introduction of 
                                                 
37  Their estimates are based on lifetimes and not on detection durations. 
38  For instance, regarding the vitamin cartel, naturally dead sub-agreements were shorter than the ones 
terminated because of the cartel detection.   
39  Connor showed that global cartels have a lifetime 55 % higher than lifetimes of other cartels, and that 
regional cartels have a lifetime 40 % higher than national ones. In our sample, most of cartels were 
detected while alive and broke up after antitrust intervention. Hence, in our study, cartels durations 
correspond approximately to detection durations. It allows us to refer to others studies on cartels 
lifetimes and to compare our work to the one of Bryant and Eckard.  
40  To our knowledge. 
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leniency programs41. Indeed, in the first time, if these programs are efficient, their 
introduction should have contributed to an increase of the probability of detection, as 
these programs imply a reduction of investigations costs, they facilitate inquiries and 
evidence collection, and jeopardize cartel stability. On the long run, these programs 
should dissuade cartel formation42 and therefore, we could also observe a reduction in 
the number of detected cartels -if fewer cartels form. Nevertheless, as Motta and Pollo 
(2003) showed, these programs can also have a counter productive effect. Indeed, 
reducing the expected fines help sustain collusive agreements and foster collusion.  
 
                                                 
41  See appendix B. Nevertheless, this increase of the number of detected cartels should be put into 
perspective with the number of birth. As some cartels remain undetected, we only have the 
subpopulation of cartels dead from detection.  
42  Aubert, Rey, Kovacic (2006). 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A- Determinants of Duration 
 
Variables  Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t value Pr >  t 
Intercept  3064.52389 624.20184 4.91 <.0001 
Nb 
Undertakings 
 36.57548 33.20373 1.10 0.2741 
Trade 
Association 
 -629.09560 557.77615 -1.13 0.2629 
Dimension Ref= Europe     
 Global 71.26517 653.59000 0.11 0.9135 
 National 141.74111 615.62781 0.23 0.8185 
Industry Ref= Europe     
 Metal & non-metallic products -422.50164 773.94921 -0.55 0.5867 
 Machinery & equipment -362.96977 770.09302 -0.47 0.6388 
 Construction-textile 1395.29539 1380.11512 1.01 0.3152 
 Services -821.16814 761.09654 -1.08 0.2840 
 Food products beverage and 
tabacco 
-1099.39343 840.50226 -1.31 0.1948 
 
 
 
B- Number of Detection (3 Years Moving Average) 
 
Number of detected cartels  
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